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Courson: Same-Sex Marriage

BAEHR v. LEWIN: HAWAII TAKES A
TENTATIVE STEP TO LEGALIZE
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Marty K. Courson*

"From Hawaii, best known for surfing, suntanning, and hula dancing, comes news that could be
the Pearl Harbor of social issues in the 1990s gay marriage."1
I. INTRODUCTION

In Baehr v. Lewin,2 the Supreme Court of Hawaii sparked a
controversy that has potential nationwide implications. The
court held that three same-sex couples were entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if the State can demonstrate that
denying the couples the right to marry under the Hawaii Marriage Law3 furthers compelling state interests. 4 If the State fails
its burden, it can no longer refuse marriage licenses to couples
merely on the basis that they are of the same sex. II Should this
occur, gay marriages will become legal in Hawaii. 6
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995. Many thanks to Rebecca
Weisman, Helen Silva, and Professor Roberta Simon of the Women's Law Forum for
invaluable comments and direction while writing this article. Also, special thanks to my
mentor, Professor Michael Zamperini, for his support, patience, and critical reviews. Finally, I would like to thank my best friend and partner, "J.B." Brainerd, for his love and
never ending faith through law review, law school, and life.
1. James P. Pinkerton, A Conservative Argument for Gay Marriage, Forming Families Leads to Social Stability. Why Fight It?, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1993, at B7.
2. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), motion for reconsideration or clarification granted in part, 852 P.2d 74 (Haw. 1993).
3. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1992) (hereinafter the "Hawaii Marriage Law").
4. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
5. [d. at 57.
6. This presupposes that the political arena has not somehow defeated same-sex
marriage in the meantime. With the prospect of these legalized couplings engendering
considerable public controversy, polls have shown about 60 percent opposition to samesex marriage. Robert Stouffer, Another View of Same-Gender Marriage, ISLAND LIFESTYLE, Jan. 1994, at 15, 17. Against this backdrop, Baehr v. Lewin is susceptible of being
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May of 1991, the plaintiffs? filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, seeking: (1) a declaration that the Hawaii
Marriage Law was unconstitutional insofar as it was construed
and applied by the Department of Health (hereinafter "DOH")8
in refusing to issue a marriage license on the sole basis that an
applicant couple was of the same sex; and (2) preliminary and
permanent injunctions prohibiting the future withholding of
marriage licenses on that sole basis. 9
The plaintiffs alleged that the DOH's interpretation and application of the Hawaii Marriage Law to deny same-sex couples
access to marriage licenses violated the plaintiffs' rights to privacy, equal protection, and due process of law, all of which were
guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution. 10
In July of 1991, the DOH filed a Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings and requested that the court dismiss the comoverturned by a State constitutional amendment. To that end, multiple bills have been
introduced in the Hawaii Legislature that would amend the Hawaii Constitution to eliminate the possibility of same-sex marriage. See, e.g., H.B. 3709, 17th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Haw. 1974) (proposing a constitutional amendment clarifying same-sex marriage as not
constitutionally protected and defining marriage as a legal relationship solely between a
male and a female).
However, another bill attempts to offer a constitutional compromise by establishing
state-wide domestic partnership registration. See H.B. 3647, 17th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw.
1974). Under this arrangement couples, who do not qualify for marriage licenses or otherwise wish not to marry, would get formal recognition by the State and enjoy the same
rights, benefits, responsibilities, and status of married people. Id. Coupled with a constitutional amendment that would outlaw same-sex marriage, this domestic-partnership arrangement is designed to placate both sides of the controversy.
7. The plaintiffs were three same-sex couples whose applications for marriage licenses were denied. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 49.
8. The DOH is the state authority that administers marriage licenses. HAW. REv.
STAT. §§ 572-5 to 72-6 (1992). Defendant John C. Lewin was sued in his official capacity
as its director. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44. Throughout this note, the DOH and Lewin will
both be referred to as the "DOH."
9. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48-49.
10. Id. at 50; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1978) ("The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.
The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right."); HAW. CONST. art. I,
§ 5 (1978) ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of
the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of
race, religion, sex or ancestry.").
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plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. l l In October of 1991, the circuit court granted the
DOH's motion and found that the DOH was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.12 The court then dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. IS
However, the Hawaii Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the circuit court order.14 In a plurality opinion/Ii the supreme
court held that the circuit court made improper factual findings16 beyond the scope of a judgment on the pleadings. I? Addi11. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 51. The following arguments were made by the DOH regarding the plaintiffs' failure to state a claim:
(1) the state's marriage laws "contemplate marriage as a union
between a man and a woman"; (2) because the only legally
recognized right to marry "is the right to enter a heterosexual
marriage, [the) plaintiffs do not have a cognizable right, fundamental or otherwise, to enter into state-licensed homosexual
marriages"; (3) the state's marriage laws do not "burden, penalize, infringe, or interfere in any way with the [plaintiffs')
private relationships"; (4) the state is under no obligation "to
take affirmative steps to provide homosexual unions with its
official approval"; (5) the state's marriage laws "protect and
foster and may help to perpetuate the basic family unit, regarded as vital to society, that provides status and a nurturing
environment to children born to married persons" and, in addition, "constitute a statement of the moral values of the community in a manner that is not burdensome to [the) plaintiffs"; (6) assuming the plaintiffs are homosexuals (a fact not
pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint), they "are neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class and do not require heightened
judicial solicitude"; and (7) even if heightened judicial solicitude is warranted, the state's marriage laws "are so removed
from penalizing, burdening, harming, or otherwise interfering
with [the) plaintiffs and their relationships and perform such
a critical function in society that they must be sustained."
[d. at 51-52 (quoting the supporting memoranda for the DOH's Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings) (footnotes omitted).
12. Baehr v. Lewin, No. 91-1394-05, slip op. at 6 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 1991).
13. [d.

14. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
15. Three opinions were filed. The prevailing plurality opinion was written by Justice Levinson and was joined by Chief Justice Moon. [d. at 48. James Bums, an Intermediate Court of Appeals Chief Judge, sitting on the court as a substitute justice, concurred
with the plurality. [d. at 68. Walter M. Heen, another Intermediate Court of Appeals
Judge sitting on the panel, filed a dissenting opinion. [d. at 70. Judge Heen's dissent
would have been joined by another judge; however, the other judge's temporary assignment to the court expired prior to the filing of the opinion. [d. at 48.
16. [d. at 53-54. The supreme court noted that:
[Without) any evidentiary record before it, the circuit court's
... order granting [the DOH's) motion for judgment on the
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tionally, the supreme court held that:
[O]n the state of the bare record before us ...
the circuit court erred when it concluded, as a
matter of law, that: (1) homosexuals 18 do not constitute a "suspect class" for purposes of equal
protection analysis under . . . the Hawaii Constitution; (2) the classification created by [the Hawaii Marriage Law] is not subject to "strict scrutiny," but must satisfy only the "rational
relationship" test; and (3) [the Hawaii Marriage
Law] satisfies the rational relationship test because the legislature "obviously designed [it] to
promote the general welfare interests of the community by sanctioning traditional man-woman
pleadings contained a variety of findings of fact. For example,
the circuit court "found" that: (1) [the Hawaii Marriage Law]
"does not infringe upon a person's individuality or lifestyle decisions, and none of the plaintiffs has provided testimony to
the contrary"; (2) [the Hawaii Marriage Law] "does not ...
restrict [or] burden. . . the exercise of the right to engage in a
homosexual lifestyle"; (3) Hawaii has exhibited a "history of
tolerance for all peoples and their cultures"; (4) "the plaintiffs
have failed to show that they have been ostracized or oppressed in Hawaii and have opted instead to rely on a general
statement of historic problems encountered by homosexuals
which may not be relevant to Hawaii"; (5) "homosexuals in
Hawaii have not been relegated to a position of 'political
powerlessness.' ... [Tlhere is no evidence that homosexuals
and the homosexual legislative agenda have failed to gain legislative support in Hawaii"; (6) the "{p}laintiffs have failed to
show that homosexuals constitute a suspect class for equal
protection analysis under ... the Hawaii State Constitution";
(7) "the issue of whether homosexuality constitutes an immutable trait has generated much dispute in the relevant scientific community"; and (8) [the Hawaii Marriage Law] "is obviously designed to promote the general welfare interests of the
community by sanctioning traditional man-woman family
units and procreation."
[d. at 53-54 (quoting Baehr v. Lewin, No. 91-1394-05, slip op. (Haw. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1,
1991» (alterations in both original and quoted material) (footnote omitted).
17. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 54. A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be based
solely on the content of the pleadings. [d. at 53.
18. Interestingly, the Baehr court noted that the DOH, by virtue of its Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, was the party which put the question of homosexuality at
issue. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 52 n.12. The court observed that parties to "a union between a
man and a woman" mayor may not be homosexuals and, conversely, parties to a samesex marriage could be either homosexuals or heterosexuals. [d. at 52 n.ll. It appears that
to the Baehr court, a person's sexual orientation is theoretically distinct from the fact
that he or she chooses to marry a man or a woman.
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family units and procreation."Is

After an exhaustive analysis, the supreme court found that
the denial of marriage to same-sex couples did indeed implicate
strict scrutiny equal protection analysis under the Hawaii Constitution. 20 Describing the circuit court's order as "run[ning]
aground on the shoals of the Hawaii Constitution's Equal Protection Clause,"21 the court determined that unresolved factual
questions precluded an entry of judgment, as a matter of law, in
favor of the DOH22 and, therefore, remanded the case to the circuit court. 23
On remand, in accordance with a strict scrutiny standard,
the DOH will have the burden of demonstrating that the Hawaii
Marriage Law furthers a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional
rights.24
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY DOES NOT INCLUDE A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

Initially, the Baehr court noted that the right to privacy
19. [d. (quoting Baehr v. Lewin, No. 91-1394-05, slip op. (Haw. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1,
1991)) (alterations in both original and quoted material) (footnote omitted).
20. [d. at 67. In Hawaii, suspect categories are subject to a strict scrutiny standard
and distinctions based on suspect categories are presumed to be unconstitutional unless
the state can show compelling state interests which justify the offending classification.
Nelson v. Miwa, 546 P.2d 1005, 1008 n.4 (Haw. 1976).
21. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 54. The court's decision rests on Hawaii's Equal Protection
Clause which is more elaborate than the United States counterpart. Under the United
States Constitution, no state may "deny; .. any person ... equal protection of the
laws," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, while the Hawaii counterpart provides that "[n]o
person shall be ... denied the equal protection of the laws, nor [their] civil rights ...
because of race, religion, sex or ancestry." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1978) (emphasis
added); see Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59-60.
22. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 54-55.
23. [d. at 68.
24. [d. During the subsequent DOH motion for the court to reconsider or clarify its
opinion, the court reiterated its instructions for remand. Motion for Reconsideration or
Clarification, granted in part, 852 P.2d 74 (Haw. 1993). The original plurality decision
was effectively converted into an outright majority when Justice Nakayama took her seat
on the five-member Hawaii Supreme Court and joined with Chief Justice Moon and Justice Levinson in the decision on the motion. [d.; see Robert Stouffer, Another View of
Same-Gender Marriage, ISLAND LIFESTYLE, Jan. 1994, at 15, 15-17.
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under the Hawaii Constitution is treated as a fundamental right
for purposes of constitutional analysis. 211 The Hawaii Constitution expressly provides that the right to privacy may not be infringed unless a compelling state interest is demonstrated. 28 Additionally, "the right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right
of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause."27 Therefore, the Baehr court needed to determine
whether the fundamental right to privacy under the Hawaii
Constitution included protection of marriages by same-sex
couples.
Emphasizing that as the "ultimate judicial tribunal" in Hawaii its authority to interpret and enforce the State's Constitution was final and unreviewable,28 the Baehr court noted that it
could give broader privacy protection under the Hawaii Constitution than was possible under the United States Constitution. 29
Nevertheless, the Baehr court determined that it was constrained by the privacy jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court
in defining the limits of Hawaii's right to privacy. so Thus, follow25. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55. During the Hawaii Constitutional Convention of 1978, the
framers articulated:
By amending the Constitution to include a separate and distinct privacy right, it is the intent of your Committee to insure
that privacy is treated as a fundamental right for purposes of
constitutional analysis. . . . It is a right that, though unstated
in the federal Constitution, emanates from the penumbra of
several guarantees of the Bill of Rights .... [TJhere has been
some confusion as to the source of the right and the importance of it. . . . By inserting clear and specific language regarding this right into the Constitution, your Committee intends to alleviate any possible confusion over the source of the
right and the existence of it.
Id. (quoting Comm. Whole Rep. No. 15, 1 Proceedings, at 1024).
26. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1978); see supra note 10.
27. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978». The
court admitted that the U.S. Supreme Court was "obviously contemplating unions between men and women when it ruled that the right to marry was fundamental." Id. at
56.
28. Id. at 57 (citing State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 377 (Haw. 1988».
29. Id. at 57; see also cases cited infra note 96.
30. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57. The Hawaii Supreme Court had previously held that the
privacy right found in the Hawaii Constitution was similar to the federal right of privacy.
State v. Mueller, 671 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Haw. 1983). The Mueller court was guided in this
determination by the proceedings of Hawaii's constitutional framers who described the
right of privacy as being similar to the right as discussed in such United States Supreme
Court cases as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Mueller, 671 P.2d at 1357-58
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ing federal jurisprudence, the court declined to extend the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples, stating that:
[W]e do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and collective
conscience of our people that failure to recognize
it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions. Neither do we believe
that a right to same-sex marriage is implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if it were
sacrificed. 31

Accordingly, the court held that the right to privacy did not
provide the applicant couples with a fundamental constitutional
right to same-sex marriage. 32
B.

EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE HAWAII CONSTITUTION Is IMPLICATED WHEN THE STATE USES ITs SOVEREIGN POWER TO
DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF SEX

Although the Baehr court rejected the right to privacy
claim, it gave favorable consideration to the plaintiffs' equal protection claim. 33 As a threshold matter, the court noted that
"[t]he power to regulate marriage is a sovereign function reserved exclusively to the respective states."3. This sovereign
power is a monopoly which had been codified by statute for over
a hundred years. 31i Further, "by its plain language, the Hawaii
(citing Comm. Whole Rep. No. 15, 1 Proceedings, at 1024).
31. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57. The court's holding on this point echoed the now familiar
refrain from U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on fundamental rights and privacy. For
example, in Griswold, the Supreme Court observed that judges, "determining which
rights are fundamental," must look not to "personal and private notions," but to the
"traditions and [collective] conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is
"so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental," Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoted in Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57); and in Palko v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court propositioned that only rights implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty can be deemed fundamental. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (cited
in Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57 n.16).
32. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57.
33. [d.
34. [d. at 58.
35. [d. The court noted that:
So zealously has this court guarded the state's role as the ex-
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Constitution prohibits state-sanctioned discrimination against
any person in the exercise of his or her civil rights on the basis
of sex."36
When the state, through its marriage monopoly, denies marital status to a same-sex couple, it deprives them of the "multiplicity of rights and benefits reserved exclusively to that particular relation. "37 The Hawaii Marriage Law implicitly restricts the
marriage relation to a male and a female. s8 However, the constitutionality of such a restriction was not to be determined simply
elusive progenitor of the marital partnership that it declared,
over seventy years ago, that 'common law' marriages-i.e.,
'marital' unions existing in the absence of a state-issued license and not performed by a person or society possessing
governmental authority to solemnize marriages-would no
longer be recognized in the Territory of Hawaii.
[d. (citing Parke v. Parke, 25 Haw. 397,404-05 (1920)).
36. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60; see HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1978); supra note 10.
37. [d. at 59. Among the rights and benefits identified by the court were: state income tax advantages, public assistance advantages, community property rights, inheritance rights, award of child custody and support payments in divorce proceedings, the
right to spousal support, the right to enter into premarital agreements, the right to
change of name, the right to file a nonsupport action, post-divorce rights relating to support and property division, the benefit of the spousal privilege and confidential marital
communications, real property benefits and exemptions, and the right to bring a wrongful death action. [d. See also Brooke Oliver, Note, Contracting for Cohabitation: Adapting the California Statutory Marital Contract to Life Partnership Agreements Between
Lesbian, Gay or Unmarried Heterosexual Couples, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 899, 900
(1993) (identifying over 450 California statutes that involve the rights, duties and privileges pertaining to marriage that together comprise the California civil marital contract).
38. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60. The requisites of a valid marriage contract are enumerated in the Hawaii Marriage Law as follows:
In order to make valid the marriage contract, it shall be
necessary that:
(1) The respective parties do not stand in relation to each
other of ancestor and descendant of any degree whatsoever,
brother and sister of the half as well as to the whole blood,
uncle and niece, aunt and nephew, whether the relationship is
legitimate or illegitimate;
(3) The man does not at the time have any lawful wife
living and that the woman does not at the time have any lawful husband living;
(7) The marriage ceremony be performed in the State by
a person or society with a valid license to solemnize marriages
and the man and the woman to be married and the person
performing the marriage ceremony be all physically present at
the same place and time for the marriage ceremony.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1985) (emphasis added).
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because the legislature contemplated unions between a man and
woman when it enacted the Hawaii Marriage Law. 8s The court
noted that constitutional violations are not sanitized by legislative action. 40
However, the DOH argued that no sex-based discrimination
had taken place. 41 The main thrust of the DOH's argument was
that persons of the same sex had no right to marry one another
because the definition and customary use of the word "marriage" includes only the special relationship between a man and
a woman. 41l Very simply, two members of the same sex could not
marry because the definition of marriage did not include that
configuration as a possibility. Thus, no impermissible discrimination implicating equal protection had taken place because of
the plaintiffs' innate biologic inability as couples to achieve married status. 48
The Baehr court distinguished two of the cases relied on by
the DOH to support its premise, Baker u. Nelson 44 and De
Santo u. Barnsley,41S describing them as "demonstrably inapposite to the appellant couples' claim."46 The Baker court had observed that dictionaries defined marriage as a union between
persons of the opposite sex.47 Additionally, same-sex marriages
were, not surprisingly, outside of the intent of the "original
draftsmen" of the Minnesota marriage statutes which had existed since the "territorial days."48 After observing this, the
Baker court held, with regard to a denial of a same-sex marriage
request, simply that (a) the state marriage law precluded samesex marriages, and (b) the United States Constitution was not
offended. 4s Unlike Baehr u. Lewin, no state constitutional ques39. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60 n.20.
40. [d. On this point, the Baehr court noted City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) ("It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by
referendum or otherwise, could not order ... action violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.").
41. Answering Brief of DOH at 21.
42. [d. at 7.
43. [d. at 21.
44. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
45. 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
46. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
47. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186 n.l.
48. [d. at 186.
49. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87.
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tions had apparently been raised or addressed, therefore, the
Baehr court deemed Baker "inapposite."IIO
The same fate fell to De Santo, where the court had held
that common law same-sex marriage did not exist in Pennsylvania. 1I1 The Baehr court called this result "irrelevant to the present case. "112 After reviewing several authorities, including
Baker, the De Santo court concluded that "common law marriage has been regarded as a relationship that can be established
only between two persons of opposite sex."IIS However, the De
Santo court did not address how a denial of same-sex marriage
violated Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment because the
issue had not been raised in the lower court.1I4 Thus, the Baehr
court distinguished both Baker and De Santo by the failures of
those courts to address the relevant state constitutional concerns
at issue in Baehr.
The Baehr court singled out two other cases relied on by
the DOH, Jones v. Hallahan lill and Singer v. Hara,1I6 for a more
in-depth analysis. 1I7 In Jones, two Kentucky women sought review of a marriage license denial,ll6 The Jones court observed
that the Kentucky marriage statutes did not specifically prohibit
marriage between persons of the same sex. liB However, the statutes did contain references to "the male and female of the species."60 Affirming the denial of the marriage license, the Jones
court held that:
[M]arriage has always been considered as the
union of a man and a woman and we have been
presented with no authority to the contrary.
It appears to us that appellants are prevented
from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky
. . . but rather by their own incapability of enter50. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
51. De Santo, 476 A.2d at 952.
52. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
53. De Santo, 476 A.2d at 953-54.
54. De Santo, 476 A.2d at 956; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
55. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
56. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974).
57. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
58. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
59. [d. at 589. The Kentucky marriage statutes are similar to Hawaii's in this regard. See Hawaii Marriage Law, partially set out, supra note 38.
60. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589 n.1.
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ing into a marriage as that term is defined.
A license to enter into a status or a relationship which the parties are incapable of achieving
is a nullity.81

With respect to Jones, the Baehr court noted that the appellants there asserted neither federal nor state equal protection
rights. 8s Thus, unlike the Baehr court, the Jones court did not
need to address or distinguish the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia. 83
Like the plaintiffs in Jones, in Singer v. Hara, a same-sex
couple sought judicial review after they were denied a marriage
license. 84 On appeal, the couple argued that the denial violated
the Washington Equal Rights Amendment86 and various provisions of the United States Constitution. 68 The Singer court held
that neither the Federal nor State constitutions were offended
by the denial. 67 The couple was "not denied a marriage license
because of their sex; rather, they were denied a marriage license
because of the nature of marriage itself. "68 The Baehr court observed that "but for the fact that the Singer court was unable to
discern sexual discrimination in the state's marriage laws, it
would have engaged in a 'strict scrutiny' analysis. "69
In Loving v. Virginia,70 the Virginia courts had declared
61. [d. at 589.
62. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
63. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See discussion, infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
64. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1188.
65. [d. at 1190. Washington's Equal Rights Amendment reads: "Equality of rights
and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex."
WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 (1972).
66. Including the Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Singer, 522 P.2d at
1188-89.
67. [d. at 1197.
68. [d. at 1196.
69. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63 n.27. The Singer court had distinguished Loving, noting
that the United States Supreme Court "did not change the basic definition of marriage
as the legal union of one man and one woman; rather, [it] merely held that the race of
the man or woman desiring to enter that relationship could not be considered by the
state in granting a marriage license." Singer, 522 P.2d at 1192 n.8.
70. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Lovings were an interracial Virginia couple who were
married out of state and were later convicted of violating Virginia's miscegenation laws
after returning there to reside. [d. at 2-3. The trial judge suspended their sentence, however, on the condition that they leave the state and not return to Virginia together for a
period of 25 years. [d. at 3. Four years later, the Lovings sought to vacate the judgment
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that interracial marriage simply could not exist because the Deity had deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural. 71 The
Baehr court observed that "[w]ith all due respect to the Virginia
courts of a bygone era, we do not believe that trial judges are the
ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply demonstrates, constitutional law may ·mandate, like it
or not, that customs change with an evolving social order."72
The Baehr court was unpersuaded by the DOH argument
that same-sex marriage was an innate impossibility because marriage only included a man-woman option. 78 The court analogized
the DOH argument to the rationale used by the courts of Virginia to deny interracial marriages, i.e., that interracial marriages were impossible because the Deity had declared them unnaturap· Characterizing the argument as "circular" and an
"exercise in tortured and conclusory sophistry," the Baehr court
dismissed contentions that the marriage license had been denied
because of the nature of marriage itself and not because of the
sex of the applicants. 7G Thus, similar to Loving where marriage
'on the ground that the miscegenation laws they were convicted under were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. [d. When the Virginia courts refused to set
aside their sentences, the Lovings pressed their appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. [d. at 3-4.
71. During the initial conviction and sentencing of the Lovings, the trial court had
invoked the name of God to support the proposition that interracial marriages should
remain illegal stating that: "Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with
his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated
the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix." Loving, 388 U.S. at 3
(quoting the trial judge) (quoted in Baehr, 852 P.2d at 62). In upholding the constitutionality of Virginia's miscegenation laws in the wake of the Loving's subsequent challenge to their conviction, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia referred to its earlier
decision in Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955). The Naim court stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not prohibit Virginia from
enacting legislation to "preserve the racial integrity of its citizens ... so that it shall not
have a mongrel breed of citizens." [d. at 756. The Naim court concluded that the State
may legislate "to prevent the obliteration of racial pride" and does not need to "permit
the corruption of blood even though it weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship."
[d. The United States Supreme Court characterized this as "obviously an endorsement
of the doctrine of White Supremacy." Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.
72. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
73. [d.
74. [d.
75. [d. Other courts have come to different conclusions. For instance, the court in
Baker v. Nelson distinguished Loving, stating that there was a "clear distinction" between marital restrictions based on race and those based upon the fundamental difference in sex. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
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was finally extended to interracial couples, extending marriage
to a same-sex couple should be based on an "evolving social order," not the will of a Deity that predetermined a fundamental
and unchanging definition of marriage. 7s By regulating access to
the marriage status on the basis of the applicants' sex, the court
found that an equal protection issue arose. '17
C.

EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE HAWAII CONSTITUTION REQUIRES LAWS CONTAINING SEx-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS TO
P ASS STRICT SCRUTINY

The Hawaii Marriage Law regulated access to the marital
status on the basis of sex, therefore, the law established a sexbased classification. 78 However, in order to decide whether the
sex-based classification at issue was constitutional, the Baehr
court needed to determine what level of equal protection analysis to apply under the Hawaii Constitution.
The Hawaii Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny analysis
to challenges of laws which classify on the basis of suspect categories7s or impinge on fundamental rights. 80 These laws are presumed unconstitutional unless the state shows a compelling
state interest81 that justifies the classification,82 and the laws are
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights. 83
However, for laws which classify on a basis other than sus76. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
77. [d. at 60.

78. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64.
79. A suspect classification exists where the class of individuals formed by a statute,
on its face or as administered, has been" ... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." [d. at 72 (Heen, J., dissenting) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
80. [d. at 63 (citing Holdman v. Olim, 581 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Haw. 1978».
81. A "compelling state interest" is a "[tJerm used to uphold state action in the face
of attack grounded on Equal Protection . . . because of serious need for such state action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 283 (6th ed. 1990). See infra note 93 for an example of a
"compelling state interest" as determined in Hawaii.
82. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64 (citing Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1167).
83. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64 (citing Nagle v. Board of Educ., 629 P.2d 109, 111 (Haw.
1981».

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2

54

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:41

pect classifications and which do not infringe on fundamental
rights, the court utilizes the rational basis test. S• Under this test,
the court will uphold the law if there exists any reasonable justification for the legislative enactment. SII Somewhere between rational basis and strict scrutiny, the Hawaii Supreme Court has
also recognized "heightened" scrutiny.se
The genesis of what level of scrutiny to apply to sex-based
classifications under the Hawaii Constitution began when the
Hawaii Supreme Court evaluated Holdman v. Dlim. S ? In
Holdman, a woman prison visitorSs sued officials when she was
refused admittance because she was not wearing a brassiere. s9
The refusal derived from a directive, promulgated by the Acting
Prison Administrator, that "visitors will be properly dressed.
Women visitors are asked to be fully clothed, including undergarments. Provocative attire is discouraged. "90 The trial court
dismissed the action at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. 91 On
appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed. 92
The Holdman court declined to set an absolute standard for
what scrutiny to apply to sex-based classifications, concluding
that the directive would survive strict scrutiny by reason of a
compelling state interest if strict scrutiny were held to apply.98
84. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64. Under the rational basis U!st, the court inquires whether
a statute rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. If it does, the statute will pass
constitutional muster. Most statutes are cloaked by the courts with a presumption of
constitutionality, primarily out of due regard for the legislative decision making process.
Nelson, 546 P.2d at 1008; see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring) ("Judicial deference is based, not on relative factfinding competence, but
on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide.").
85. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64; see also Estate of Coates v. Pacific Eng'g, 791 P.2d 1257,
1260 (Haw. 1990) (applying the rational basis test to the Hawaii Workers' Compensation
statute, finding legitimate the state interest of securing guaranteed compensation for injured parties and their dependents, even though precluding claims by non-dependent
parents).
86. See infra note 94.
87. 581 P.2d 1164 (Haw. 1978).
88. The visitor happened to be the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii. [d. at 1166 n.l. On appeal, it was not suggested that she was refused entry into the prison for reasons other than her lack of brassiere. [d.
89. [d. at 1166.
90. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64 (quoting Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1166) (emphasis omitted).
91. See Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1165-66.
92. [d.
93. [d. at 1168. The court determined that maintenance of order and control in a
prison was a vital governmental objective. [d. at 1167. Additionally, the court noted that
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Nevertheless, the Holdman court enunciated some important
principles that would buttress the logic of the Baehr court's
opinion. First, the court established that sex-based classifications are subject to either strict or intermediate level scrutiny
for purposes of equal protection analysis under the Hawaii Constitution. 94 Second, for purposes of analysis, the court assumed
that sex-based classifications were subject to strict scrutiny.911
Third, the court reaffirmed the principle that Hawaii's citizens
could be given greater protections under the Hawaii Constitution than those recognized under the United States Constitution. 98 Finally, the court looked to United States Supreme Court
lack of a brassiere had been controversial and regarded as sexually provocative by some
members of society. [d. Thus, dress restrictions imposed on women visitors were required
for maintenance of order and control in the prison and related to this vital government
objective out of the assumption that inmates would regard the lack of a brassiere as
provocative. [d. at 1168. Consequently, the court determined that the directive had a
sufficiently substantial relationship to the achievement of the important governmental
objective of prison security that it would withstand the test of strict scrutiny by reason
of a compelling state interest. [d. at 1169. While declining to enunciate a standard of
review for an equal rights claim, the court nevertheless found on the facts that the equal
protection challenge had not been sustained. [d. at 1170.
94. Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1167-70. The Holdman court noted that under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, sex-based classifications were governed by a standard between rational basis and strict scrutiny. [d. at 1167 (quoting Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives."».
In decisions subsequent to Holdman, the Hawaii Supreme Court reaffirmed that
sex-based classifications were subject, at the very least, to "intermediate scrutiny" under
the Hawaii Constitution. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 65 n.31; see State v. Tookes, 699 P.2d 983,
988 (Haw. 1985) ("Even if [a gender-neutral anti-prostitution statute was] deemed to set
up a gender-based classification, it would be invalid only if it did not serve important
government objectives and was not substantially related to achieving those objectives.");
see also State v. Rivera, 612 P.2d 526, 529 (Haw. 1980) (upholding a rape statute that set
up a gender-based classification while noting that under the State Equal Protection
Clause, a sex-based distinction must serve governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives in order to withstand judicial scrutiny).
95. Noting that the more stringent compelling state interest test would be satisfied
if it were held to be applicable, the court reserved for future consideration the application of this test to assess sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Hawaii Constitution. Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1168.
96. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 65-66; Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1168; State v. Texeira, 433 P.2d
593, 597 n.2 (Ha~. 1967) ("As long as we afford defendants the minimum protection
required by federal interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, we are unrestricted in interpreting the constitution ofthis state to afford greater
protection."); State v. Grahovac, 480 P.2d 148, 151-52 (Haw. 1971) (holding that the
court was free to go beyond the minimal requisites of the Federal Constitution in protecting one's right of silence under the State Constitution); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d
657,664 (Haw. 1971) (noting that although the United States Supreme Court is the final
arbiter of the meaning of the United States Constitution and its Amendments, the Ha-
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cases for guidance. 97
Of the United States Supreme Court cases cited in
Holdman, the Baehr court singled out Frontiero v. Richardson98
for analysis. 99 Frontiero involved the right of a female member
of the armed services to claim her spouse as a "dependent" for
the purposes of obtaining· increased housing allowances and
other benefits on a par with male members.loo According to the
regulations then existing, a serviceman could claim his wife as a
"dependent" without regard to whether she was, in fact, dependent upon him for any part of her support. IOI A servicewoman,
on the other hand, could not claim her husband as a "dependent" unless he was in fact dependent upon her for over onehalf of his support. I02 Thus, the question was whether this differential treatment constituted unconstitutional discrimination
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. IOS In concurring opinions, eight Supreme Court justices
concluded that the regulations established impermissibly differential treatment between men and women. I04
Nonetheless, there was disagreement on the level of judicial
scrutiny applicable to statutory sex-based discrimination. In a
four-justice plurality opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that sexbased classifications, like those based on race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and should be subjected to
waii Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Hawaii Constitution and that nothing
prevents Hawaii from providing greater protections than required by the United States
Constitution); State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 57-62 (Haw. 1974) (extending the protections of the Hawaii Bill of Rights beyond those of textually parallel provisions in the
Federal Bill of Rights resulting in greater restrictions on police in Hawaii who conduct
searches incident to lawful arrests); State v. Manzo, 573 P.2d 945, 953 (Haw. 1977) (recognizing the court had the power to give wider protections to obscene material under the
Hawaii Constitution than accorded under the Federal Constitution).
97. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 66.
98. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
99. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 66-67.
100. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678.
101. [d.
102. [d.
103. [d. at 679. Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection Clause, it is interpreted to forbid discrimination that is so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process. [d. at 680 n.5.
104. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-92. Justice Rehnquist filed the sole dissenting
opinion.
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strict judicial scrutiny.10&
However, in a three-justice concurring opinion, Justice Powell maintained that while the challenged statutes unconstitutionally discriminated against servicewomen, a finding that sex was a
suspect classification invoking strict scrutiny should have been
deferred. loe Justice Powell contended that the Equal Rights
Amendment, approved by Congress and submitted for ratification by the States would, if adopted, resolve the very question at
issue in Frontiero. 107 According to Justice Powell, the Court
should not "pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision which is currently in the process of resolution."108
Finally, Justice Stewart concurred in a single sentence, simply agreeing that the statutes at issue worked an "invidious
discrimination. "109
Frontiero demonstrated to the Baehr court that a large majority of the United States Supreme Court would have subjected
statutory sex-based classifications to strict scrutiny in the presence of the Equal Rights Amendment. llo Since Hawaii has an
equal rights amendment,111 the Baehr court concluded that it
was time to resolve the precise level of scrutiny to apply to sexbased classifications. ll2 Consequently, the court held that sex is
a "suspect category" for purposes of equal protection analysis
under the Hawaii Constitution.ll8 Therefore, the Hawaii Marriage Law, and the sex-based classification it contains, must now
105. 1d. at 683.
106. 1d. at 691-92.
107.1d.
108. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691-92. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was
passed by Congress in 1972, but was defeated in 1982 when it fell three states short of
ratification. See John Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, via Croson, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 508, 519 (1993). As the twenty-seventh amendment to the Constitution, the ERA
would have provided that "[e)quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." 1d. at 519 n.75; see
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
109. 1d. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
110. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
111. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State
on account of sex. The legislature shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this section." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1978).
112. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
113. 1d.
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be subject to strict scrutiny.114 Accordingly, the court held that
the Hawaii Marriage Law is presumptively unconstitutional and
will require a showing by the DOH that the sex-based classification is justified by compelling state interests.11&

D. PLURALITY'S CONCLUSION
Because sex-based classifications had now been elevated to
the status of "suspect category," and the Hawaii Marriage Law
denied access to the marital status based on the sex of the applicant couples, the plurality held that the circuit court erroneously
granted the DOH's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. ll6
Therefore, they vacated the circuit court's judgment and re'manded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with their opinion. ll7 The burden now rests on the DOH
to rebut the presumption that the Hawaii Marriage Law is unconstitutional by demonstrating that it furthers compelling state
interests and is narrowly tailored to avoid an unnecessary infringement of constitutional rights. 118

IV. CONCURRENCE
While concurring with the plurality that the circuit court
erroneously granted the DOH's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, Judge Burns believed that a genuine issue of material
fact remained. 11s Although he agreed that the Hawaii Constitution mandates that any State action that discriminates against a
person because of his or her "sex" requires a strict scrutiny analysis, he believed the word "sex" referred only to aspects that
were "biologically fated."llIO Thus, to Judge Burns, the question
114. [d.
115. [d. Interestingly, unlike the court in Holdman, the Baehr court expressed no
opinion on whether the DOH would be able to show such a compelling state interest.
116. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
117. [d.
118. [d.; see Motion for Reconsideration or Clarification, granted in part, 852 P.2d
74 (Haw. 1993). As stated supra note 24, Justice Nakayama took her seat on the Hawaii
Supreme Court and joined the plurality in the Motion for Reconsideration or Clarification, effectively converting the holding to that of an outright majority.
119. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
120. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69. Judge Burns observed that there was considerable debate of whether a person's sexual orientation was a product of biology or environment.
[d. He believed that the Hawaii Constitution only provides protection to those sexual
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of whether homosexuality was "biologically fated" would need to
be answered in order to determine whether the Hawaii Constitution bars discrimination against same-sex marriages. 121
The plurality, however, took exception to Judge Burns' determination that sexual orientation must be "biologically fated"
in order to be protected. 122 They wrote that for the purposes of
constitutional analysis germane to this case, it does not matter
whether homosexuality is "an immutable trait," i.e., "biologically fated," because it did not matter whether the plaintiffs
were homosexuals.123 The determination of the immutability of
homosexuality was not necessary to: 1) determine whether the
Hawaii Marriage Law denied same-sex couples access to the
marital status and its related rights and benefits, 2) support the
conclusion that Hawaii's regulation of marital access, on the basis of sex, gave rise to an equal protection violation, or 3) exercise strict scrutiny review since the plurality was "unable to perceive any conceivable relevance of [homosexuality] to ...
whether [the Hawaii Marriage Law] furthers compelling state
interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights. "124
V. DISSENT
The dissenting writer, Judge Heen, agreed with the plurality
that the applicant same-sex couples did not have a fundamental
right to marriage under the Hawaii State Constitution. 1211 This
was one of the few points he did agree with. Judge Heen did not
agree with the plurality that the applicant couples had a "civil
right" to same-sex marriage;126 the Hawaii Marriage Law unconcharacteristics that were "biologically fated." 1d. at 70.
121. 1d. at 70.
122. 1d. at 53 n.14.
123. 1d.
124. 1d.
125. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 70.
126. The plurality wrote that Judge Heen made some basic "misconstructions" of
their opinion. 1d. at 67. Calling his conclusions "premature," they pointed out that they
did not hold that the plaintiffs had a "civil right" to a same-sex marriage. 1d. They
pointed out that they had noted that the United States Supreme Court had recognized
marriage to be a basic civil right for over 50 years. 1d. Further, this recognition of marriage as a civil right was relevant to the prohibition in the Hawaii Constitution against
discrimination in the exercise of a person's civil rights on the basis of sex. 1d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994

19

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2

60

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:41

stitutionally discriminates against same-sex applicants who seek
a marriage license;127 the applicant couples were entitled to an
evidentiary hearing where a strict scrutiny standard of review
would be applied; or the Hawaii Marriage Law is presumptively
unconstitutional. 128 Additionally, Judge Heen regarded the denial of statutory benefits accorded to legal, heterosexual marriages as a claim best left to the legislature. 129
Judge Heen asserted that Loving v. Virginia 130 does not
stand for the proposition that the "civil right" to marriage
should be extended to same-sex couples, because Loving involved only race. 18l Because the Hawaii Marriage Law applied
equally to both sexes, he concluded that equal protection under
the HawaH Constitution was not offended. 181 The plurality was
quick to point out the deficiency they perceived in Judge Heen's
reasoning, observing that his underlying rationale had been expressly considered and
rejected in Loving. 188 Nevertheless, Judge
,
127. Again, the plurality took exception to Judge Heen's characterization. They
pointed out that what they had held was that the Hawaii Marriage Law denied same-sex
couples access to marriage, thus implicating the Hawaii Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause. [d. at 67.
128. [d. at 70.
129. [d. See supra note 37 for a non-exhaustive list of benefits accorded to married
couples.
130. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
131. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 70.
132. [d. at 71. Judge Heen did agree with the plurality that the applicant couples'
sexual preferences are completely irrelevant. [d. at 71 n.3. However, Judge Heen believed
the plurality missed the real thrust of why sexual preferences were irrelevant to the Hawaii Marriage Law, i.e., the Law applied equally to both sexes. [d. Since all males and
females are treated alike, the Hawaii Marriage Law did not create a "suspect" classification based on gender. [d. at 71. For Judge Heen, it was sufficient that "[a1 male cannot
obtain a license to marry another male, and a female cannot obtain a license to marry
another female. Neither sex is being granted a right or benefit the other does not have,
and neither sex is being denied a right or benefit that the other has." [d.
133. [d. at 67-68. The Commonwealth of Virginia contended in Loving that since its
miscegenation statutes punished both interracial marriage participants equally, despite
the statute's racial classifications, no "invidious discrimination" based upon race occurred. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8. In Loving, the United States Supreme Court rejected "the
notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial classifications is
enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of
all invidious racial discriminations." [d. The Court noted that equal application of statutes which contained racial classifications did not immunize them "from the very heavy
burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of
state statutes drawn according to race." [d. at 8-9. By substituting the word "sex" for
"race" and the Hawaii Equal Rights Amendment for the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Baehr court believed Loving to be identical to the case before it, yielding the same conclusion that it had reached. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
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Heen did not find the analogy between the race-based classification in Loving and the sex-based classification of the Hawaii
Marriage Law persuasive, claiming that the "operative distinction lies in the relationship which is described by the term 'marriage' itself, and that relationship is the legal union of one man
and one woman."IS4 Judge Heen agreed with the DOH and the
courts which had reached a result contrary to that of the plurality.m Judge Heen borrowed the language and reasoning of the
Singer court when he wrote that:
[A]ppellants are not being denied entry into the
marriage relationship because of their sex; rather,
they are being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of the recognized definition of
that relationship as one which may be entered
into only by two persons who are members of the
opposite sex.ISG

The plurality had called this reasoning ·"tautological and
circular. "IS7
VI.

CRITIQUE

After writing an exhaustive opinion which examined many
cases, the plurality authoritatively held that sex-based classifications were subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitu134. [d. at 71.
135. [d.; see Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that a
lesbian couple was prevented from marrying by their incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is defined); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (holding the state marriage law precluded same-sex marriages and the United States Constitution was not offended by this preclusion); De Santo
v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding common law marriage was a
relationship that could be established only between persons of the opposite sex); and
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008
(1974) (holding neither the Federal nor State constitutions were offended by the denial
of the marriage license and that the applicant couple was denied a marriage license because the nature of marriage did not include a same-sex configuration). See discussion,
supra part III.C.
136. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (quoting Singer, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192).
137. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. One author describes the Singer quotation as both "contradictory and circular," pointing out that the quote says that the reason the applicant
couple was "denied equal protection of the laws is not because of their sex, but because
of their sex; second, it says that the reason same-sex couples cannot marry is because
same-sex couples cannot marry." Otis R. Damslett, Note, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 555, 574 (1993).
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tion. 138 In so doing, the plurality almost incidentally, and perhaps, accidentally, marked a victory for "gay rights." However,
by characterizing Baehr v. Lewin as a "sex" issue rather than a
"homosexual" one, the plurality has divested legal reasoning
from practical reality.
Although the plurality observed that the DOH was the
party which put the plaintiffs' homosexuality at issue,189 the fact
remains that a same-sex couple is, for all practical purposes,
synonymous with a homosexual couple. As the court points out,
it is theoretically possible for a same-sex union to exist where
the parties are, nevertheless, heterosexual. uo However, simple
logic and common sense dictate that these configurations would
be somewhat rare since the marital relationship is typically one
where emotions, intimacy and sex occur.141 Therefore, it can be
stated with objective reasonableness that opposite-sex marriage
partners would be heterosexual and same-sex marriage partners
would be homosexual. Regardless, it is not necessary to illustrate
the absurd or the very rare; the applicant couples in Baehr v.
Lewin are homosexuals and, as homosexuals, were selected for
their role as plaintiffs to test the Hawaii Marriage Law.14II All
wordplay aside, the core issue at stake in Baehr v. Lewin is
whether to extend a basic civil right in our society to
homosexuals. 148
It must be noted that not all gay or lesbian Americans wish

to achieve parity in civil rights with heterosexual America
through the institution of marriage. Some see marriage as a
"sexist, patriarchal institution that lesbian and gay people
should not be seeking to enter."144 However, advocates counter
that same-sex marriage should be a high priority because "as
long as lesbian and gay people are denied this privilege, they are
138. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
139. Id. at 52 n.12.
140. Id. at 51 n.ll.; see discussion supra note 18.
141. The question of whether sex is inherent in marriage is a premise that may be
open to argument.
142. Michelangelo Signorile, Bridal Wave, OUT, Dec. 1993 at 69, 72.
143. In his concurrence, Judge Burns at least considered the fact that the sexuality
of the plaintiffs was relevant, albeit only those aspects of sexuality that are "biologically
fated." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69·70. In so doing, he explicitly mentions the word "homosex·
ual," whereas the plurality had determined sexual orientation to be irrelevant to their
holding. See discussion supra section IV.
14. Ruth Colker, Marriage, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 321 (1991) (citations omitted).
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denied full citizenship."I411 Andrew Sullivan, the gay conservative editor of The New Republic, argues that equal access to
marriage is the critical measure necessary for full gay equality.14s
He states that:
[T]he marriage ban deals with the core of what it
is to be a member of civil society. Marriage is not
simply a private contract; it is a social and public
recognition of a private commitment. As such it is
the highest public recognition of our personal integrity. Denying it to gay people is the most public affront possible to civil equality.... In contemporary America, marriage has become a way
in which the state recognizes an emotional and economic commitment of two people to each other
for life. No law requires children to consummate
it. And within that definition, there is no civil way
it can logically be denied homosexuals, except as
a pure gesture of public disapproval. 147

Whether or not all of gay and lesbian America embraces the
idea, the court in Baehr v. Lewin has brought same-sex marriage
significantly closer to a reality. However, by utilizing a "backdoor" approach rather than addressing the real issue of extending a basic civil right to homosexuals, the court has engaged
in the same type of circular reasoning that it found objectionable in Jones and Singer. 148 Here, the court finds that equal protection of the laws is offended, not because the plaintiffs are
homosexual, but because the plaintiffs are denied access to
marriage on account of being the same sex. Not only does this
approach offend the sensibilities by characterizing an obvious issue as something else via legalistic legerdemain, it offends many
gays and lesbians by continuing to treat homosexuals as secondclass citizens who deserve protection under the laws only because the legislature was not careful when it drafted its statutes.
145. [d. at 322 (citations omitted).
146. Andrew Sullivan, The Politics of Homosexuality: a New Case for a New Beginning, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 10, 1993, at 24.
147. [d.
148. As discussed, supra part I1LB, the courts in Singer v. Hara and Jones v. Hallahan, found that applicant same-sex couples were not denied marriage licenses because of
their sex, but, rather, were denied marriage licenses because of the nature of marriage.
The Baehr court had termed this "circular" and an "exercise in tortured and conclusory
sophistry." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
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Defending its holding and the underlying logic, the Baehr
court observed that:
The result we reach today is in complete harmony
with the Loving Court's observation that any
state's powers to regulate marriage are subject to
the constraints imposed by the constitutional
right to the equal protection of the laws. I '9 If it
should ultimately be determined that the marriage laws of Hawaii impermissibly discriminate
against the appellants, based on the suspect category of sex, then that would be the result of the
interrelation of existing legislation. lGO
[W]hether the legislation under review is wise or
unwise is a matter with which we have nothing to
do. Whether it ... work[s] well or work[s] ill
presents a question entirely irrelevant to the issue. The only legitimate inquiry we can make is
whether it is constitutional. If it is not, its virtues,
if it have any, cannot save it; if it is, its faults
cannot be invoked to accomplish its destruction.
If the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well be abandoned. m

One author has written that "[s]omewhere among the many
states with constitutions that explicitly protect rights to equal
protection, freedom of religion, liberty, and privacy, it is possible
that a court will be found that will enforce those lofty guarantees and provide all its citizens equal access to the marriage institution."1112 Hawaii may eventually be one' of those "many
states." However, the Hawaiian court would have more credibility if it enforced these "lofty guarantees" with a clear statement
that gay and lesbian unions deserve as much dignity and respect
as heterosexual unions and not simply shroud equal protection
for same-sex unions in the mist of sex-based classifications.
149. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 7).
150. [d.
151. [d. (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (Suth-

erland, J., dissenting».
152. Otis R. Damslet, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 555, 590
(1993).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Hawaii's tentative steps towards same-sex marriage has fueled speculation on the effect such a union would have in other
states.lIlS Baehr v. Lewin becomes important not just for what
may eventually happen in Hawaii, but also for these national
implications.
The traditional rule is that a marriage is valid everywhere if
valid under the law of the state where the marriage takes
place. 1G4 However, when a claimed incident of marriage is sought
to be enjoyed in a state where such enjoyment violates strong
public policy, a marriage otherwise valid will be denied effect.lGG
If the DOH cannot find a "compelling state interest," and Hawaii eventually legalizes same-sex marriage, at least some states
will likely refuse to recognize such legal unions. m At some point,
the United States Supreme Court may intervene as the final arbiter of disputes among the many states.
The Loving case demonstrates that the Supreme Court is
willing to intervene when states fail to recognize marriages on
constitutionally impermissible grounds. m In Loving, the plaintiffs were able to enter into a legal marriage in the District of
Columbia but were unable to legally return to Virginia to establish their marital abode.1GB However, the real implication of Lov153. In the aftermath of Baehr u. Lewin, many newspaper articles, columns, and
letters to the editor appeared nationwide discussing the issue of same-sex marriage. A
clipping of headlines paints a, picture of confusion and dilemma: Gay Marriage, Ruling
in Hawaii Seed for Legal Chaos in Nation, Would Challenge States' Honoring of Each
Others' Laws, PHOENIX GAZETTE, May 17, 1993, at A10; Hawaii's Solution, Ohio's Dilemma? Court Rulings Unclear on Same-Sex Nuptials, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May
18, 1993, at 5B; Sunstroke on Hawaii's Supreme Court?, NEWSDAY, May 11, 1993, at SO.
154. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY. CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.5 (2d ed. 1992).
155. [d.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 283(2) (1988): "A marriage
which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state
which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time
of the marriage."
156. Amongst these will probably be states where courts have previously issued decisions on the legality of same-sex marriages. See cases discussed supra notes 44-69 and
accompanying text.
157. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding anti-miscegenation statutes based
on racial classifications violative of the United States Constitution) (see discussion supra
notes 70-77 and accompanying text).
158. [d. at 2.
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ing was not simply the right to enter into a marriage, but the
right also to live anywhere the plaintiffs chose. Baehr v. Lewin
has similar implications.

With the relatively recent decision of Bowers v. Hardwickl&9
acting as a black cloud over gay civil rights, it is difficult to imagine the Supreme Court extending the fundamental right to
marry to same-sex couples as they did to interracial couples in
Loving. 1eo However, while difficult to imagine, it is not impossible. 1e1 Significantly, not until 1967 were interracial couples given
the right to marry.1e2 As Loving amply illustrates, moral certainties do change with time. lea

159. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
160. In Hardwick, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision upheld Georgia's sex-neutral
sodomy statute, indicating that the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable is an adequately rational basis to support the law. Id. at 196. The Court refused to find a "fundamental right" to engage in
homosexual sodomy, even in the privacy of one's own home, noting that proscriptions
against sodomy have ancient roots. Id. at 192. Justice White, in his majority opinion,
characterized as "facetious" the·notion that homosexual sodomy is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 194.
161. Justice White, the author of Hardwick is no longer on the Court.
162. See Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
163. James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93, 93 (1993). Mr. Trosino notes that in a 1991 poll of
1500 Americans of all races, one of every five caucasians believed that interracial marriage should be illegal. In 1972, two in five caucasians had held similar beliefs. Id. at 93

n.3.
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